Anonymous authentication has significant contribution to privacy protection in safety message dissemination for Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks (VANETs); however, it suffers from heavy workload of vehicle revocation check and message signature verification, which leads to unsatisfactory timeliness and high message loss rate in heavy traffic situations. To manage these challenging problems, this paper proposes an efficient safety message authentication protocol for VANETs by combining batch group signature verification and our proposed Group Session Key (GSK). Specifically, our signature verification method for safety message can both achieve computation efficiency by reducing the number of computation operations of bilinear pairing and resist impersonation attack by using tracking key implement. GSK is associated with the forward and backward keys and is only shared among unrevoked vehicle within a group. Performance analysis and simulations demonstrate that our protocol can provide promising security against various common types of attackers and is more efficient than traditional group-signature-based authentication protocols, in terms of computation time cost, authentication delay and message loss rate.
I. INTRODUCTION
By supporting the exchange of safety messages, including location, speed and other driving information, between intelligent vehicles, Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks (VANETs) can greatly improve driving safety and traffic efficiency [1] - [4] . However, in the safety message exchange process, malicious attacker can infer a user's identity, occupation and other sensitive information through trajectory tracking, and might launch an attack that can result in accidents, injuries, or even fatalities [5] . In addition, safety message exchange is usually based on open-air radio, and thus various security attacks, such as bogus information attack and impersonation attack, might also be launched to VANETs [6] .
In order to resolve the aforementioned security and privacy issues, anonymous message authentication protocols based on pseudonym and digital signature have been proposed [7] - [11] . Pseudonym schemes based on Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) was emerged to VANETs [2] , [12] - [15] , and in these schemes, vehicle users need to load The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Lei Shu . public-private key pairs and certificates from a trusted third party. Identity-based cryptography (IBC)-based protocols extend the idea of PKI-based protocols by deriving public keys from identifiers [16] - [20] . One of the main drawbacks of these two protocols is that they both require vehicles to change pseudonyms periodically to protect vehicle identity from revealing to potential attackers, which will incur considerable overhead in generation, delivery, storage, and verification of numerous certificates (or private keys in the case of IBC). To mitigate this overhead, group signature based protocols [21] - [25] introduce a group-wide public key such that any vehicle in a group can sign messages on behalf of the group and thus interacting with centralized pseudonym providers and updating pseudonyms can be avoided. In addition, once a vehicle is found to be malicious, it should be revoked from the VANETs. The Certificate Revocation List (CRL)-based revocation scheme is widely used where all revoked vehicles' identity information is included.
When a safety message is received, a vehicle has to check CRL to avoid exchanging messages with revoked vehicles and verify the sender's signature to check the validity of the received message. Approximately, it needs 9ms to check one sender's identity in CRL and 29.1ms to verify a message attached with group signature [21] , while vehicles are required to send safety message around every 300ms [26] . Apparently, in a high-density traffic scenario, the sequentially computational time cost in signature verification process is too high to satisfy the stringent time requirement of VANETs and this might result in high message loss [27] , [28] .
Under the premise of ensuring security and privacy protection, in order to solve the above challenge, we adopt a batch group signature scheme [29] to achieve efficient message signature verification and propose Group Session Key (GSK)-based revocation strategy to achieve fast vehicle revocation check. Our main contributions are listed as follows:
(1) We assume a regional network model and propose a security and efficient batch group signature verification method, to reduce the number of time consuming computation operations of performing bilinear pairing to 1/n of traditional serial authentication manner, as is demonstrated in section IV-C, where n is the number of received messages. In addition, by using tracking key to hide the private key used by the vehicle to sign messages, our protocol can both provide conditional privacy and prevent vehicles from impersonation attacks, and the advantage of utilizing this arrangement is further justified in section V-B.
(2) GSK that is generated by hash function is introduced within a group in our protocol. By utilizing revocation polynomial and masking polynomial, only unrevoked vehicles can recover GSK correctly, through which malicious vehicles can be excluded from the group. By applying GSK to the safety message signature, message receivers can quickly determine whether the message sender has been revoked or not. It guarantees both the efficiency and security of message authentication within a group. The GSK management method is introduced in section III together with the network model, and the GSK-based vehicle revocation process is introduced in section IV.
Moreover, security analysis and performance evaluation are made to validate our protocol. Simulation results demonstrate that our protocol is more efficient than traditional group-signature-based protocols in terms of computation complexity, message authentication delay and message loss rate.
The rest parts of this paper are organized as follow. In section II, we give the related work of most recent and relevant message authentication protocols for VANETs. In section III, we introduce the network model and the preliminary of our protocol. Section IV presents our proposed protocol in detail. Security analysis and performance evaluation are then presented in section V and VI, respectively. Finally, we conclude this paper in section VII.
II. RELATED WORK
In the field of safety message authentication for VANETs, according to the cryptography scheme used to implement pseudonym and signature, three major categories are distinguished, i.e., PKI-based protocols, IBC-based protocols and group-signature-based protocols.
A. PKI-BASED PROTOCOLS
PKI-based protocols provide pseudonyms by public key certificates. In an early protocol [12] , vehicles load a large number of pseudonym certificates from the Trust Authority (TA). When safety message is sent, vehicles attach a corresponding certificate to the message. The TA revokes malicious vehicles by uploading their certificates to CRL and updates CRL throughout the network. In this scheme, large storage, computation and communication resources will be consumed for managing certificates and executing CRL check [22] .
To improve authentication efficiency, Wasef and Shen [13] utilized Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC) check instead, but the corresponding key used to acquire HMAC is a global key and thus time and resource cost of performing its key updating is relatively high. Recently, Simplicio et al. [2] proposed a novel design called Activation Codes for Pseudonym Certificates (ACPC) and addressed the issue of large CRLs. In such design, particular short-bit activation codes are applied to vehicles to reduce the overall CRL's size. However, due to the decentralized nature and large scale of vehicular networks, dissemination of revocation information via CRL leads to a major challenge for effective pseudonym and node revocation. To avoid the drawbacks of centralized management, Lu et al. [14] used RSUs (Road Side Units) to assign short-lifetime pseudonyms and certificates to vehicles, but they did not provide the corresponding revocation scheme. Kang et al. [15] introduced a fog computing method to transfer pseudonym management to resources at the network edge. However, the scheme is not relatively applicable to VANETs with sparse vehicles.
B. IBC-BASED PROTOCOLS
In IBC-based protocols, a vehicle user's public key can be derived from its identifiers. Zhang et al. [16] proposed an IBC-based batch authentication scheme for RSUs, in which vehicles generate pseudonym and private key autonomously. Following that, Chim et al. [17] proposed a scheme in which the TA holds the master secret and vehicles load pseudonym and private key from the TA periodically. Whereas, Horng et al. [18] demonstrated that the proposed scheme in [17] cannot resist impersonation attack. Considering the high computational cost of bilinear pairing, Lo and Tsai [19] proposed a new IBC algorithm and then adopted it to propose a novel authentication scheme. In such scheme, the TA is responsible for assigning private keys to vehicles and RSUs, and RSUs can authenticate messages in batch manner. Cui et al. [20] proposed a scheme without bilinear pairing. By using Cuckoo filter and binary search method in the batch verification phase, the scheme achieves higher success rate.
C. GROUP-SIGNATURE-BASED PROTOCOLS
In group-signature-based protocols, signatures generated by any member of the group can be authenticated using VOLUME 7, 2019 the common group public key. Based on group signature, Lin et al. [21] constructed a conditional privacy-preserving V2V communication system, in which they used a single membership manager to assign private keys to vehicles, making it difficult for the manager to revoke malicious vehicles effectively in large-size VANETs. Zhang et al. [22] employed several RSUs, each of which maintains and manages an on-the-fly group within its communication range and RSUs revoke malicious vehicles by updating private/public keys. As a replacement of time-consuming CRL check, Zhu et al. [23] introduced HMAC. However, in such scheme, a compromised RSU may launch impersonate attack. To achieve efficient message authentication and message reliability decision simultaneously, Shao et al. [24] combined decentralized group model and threshold authentication method. Unfortunately, it cannot satisfy traceability [25] .
Overall, the current research on anonymous message authentication for VANETs has made some progress, however further research is still in need on how to improve the efficiency of message authentication while ensuring security and privacy protection.
III. NETWORK MODEL AND GSK MANAGEMENT METHOD
This section first introduces the entities and their functions in the network, and then describes the GSK management method utilized in our protocol.
A. NETWORK MODEL
Our network model is comprised of a TA, several intelligent vehicles and RSUs, as shown in Fig. 1 . The TA has the highest authority, communication, computation and storage capabilities, and must be well protected to ensure that it cannot be compromised by any adversary. Assume that every city has a TA, and the TA predivides the jurisdiction into several geographic regions and a group consists of fixed RSUs and mobile vehicles in each region.
Vehicles are required to register their details in the TA before using VANETs. Each vehicle's On-Board-Unit (OBU) will periodically broadcast its safety-related status information such as location, speed and direction.
RSUs communicate with vehicles within their coverage region through wireless channels and exchange messages with the TA and other RSUs in real time through wired channel.
B. GSK MANAGEMENT METHOD
In our protocol, GSK is used to acquire information for revocation check. All unrevoked vehicles in the same region group share an identical GSK, which is issued by the regiongroup-managing RSUs when a vehicle applies to join the region group. The GSK is updated periodically or when a malicious vehicle is found and it is carefully designed that only unrevoked vehicles can obtain the updated GSK, and thus malicious vehicles can be revoked. Moreover, a message receiver can determine whether the message sender is revoked or not by checking the GSK-based verification information attached in the received safety messages, which will be introduced in detail in section IV.
Based on the secure key distributing method proposed in [31] , we propose an improved GSK managing method. In our proposed method, the main procedures include prepare GSK, issue GSK, and update GSK, which are described below. The main notations for GSK management method are shown in Table 1 . 
1) PREPARE GSK
The network lifetime is partitioned into time intervals called sessions, and it is assumed that the maximum number of sessions is l. At the beginning, for each region group, the TA selects a hash function, picks a bivariate polynomial and constructs hash chains by using the PreGSK algorithm. PreGSK:
where n is a positive integer that is smaller than the number of group members; a i,j is constant coefficient; x and y are variables; m is a large prime number and F m is a field of order m. (b) Select two randomly initialized secret seeds: forward seed S F 0 and backward seed S B 0 .
(c) Successively applying H (·) on S F 0 and S B 0 , a forward hash chain and a backward hash chain can be formed, respectively:
When a vehicle, noted as V i , requests to join a region group in the j th session, the RSU executes the IssGSK algorithm to issue forward key K F j , backward key K B l−j +1 and also to prepare for vehicle revocation. Then, the vehicle executes the GetGSK algorithm to get its GSK.
IssGSK: (a) Find the forward key K F j = H j S F 0 in the forward hash chain and the backward key K B l−j +1 = H l−j +1 S B 0 in the backward hash chain; (b) Generate a temporary and anonymous identity TV j i for the vehicle and computes its corresponding polynomial f (TV
Note that, by introducing different ω j for different sessions, vehicles joined in different sessions cannot collude to obtain the secret structural information of f (x, y) from (4) .
3) UPDATE GSK RSUs broadcast the GSK updating inform by using the UpdGSK algorithm. UpdGSK: Let R j denote the set of all temporary anonymous identity of malicious vehicles revoked in and before jth session, such that R j = w ≤ n, where w denotes the number of revoked vehicles and n is the degree of the polynomial f (x,y). Let R j j = TV j r 1 , TV j r 2 , . . . , TV j r w be the set of all temporary anonymous identity of malicious vehicles joining the group in j th session and revoked before or in jth session, 1 ≤ j ≤ j.
(a) Find the jth forward key K F j in the forward hash chain and the (l−j + 1)th backward key K B l−j+1 in the backward hash chain.
(b) Construct the revocation polynomials for the users joining the group in different sessions.
where ω j · f (x, K F j ) plays as masking polynomial.
(d) Broadcast updating message B j :
When an unrevoked vehicle joining the group in j th (1 ≤ j ≤ j) session receives the broadcasted message B j , it executes the RecGSK algorithm to recover the jth GSK.
RecGSK:
. 
Note that, it is easy to generate
Therefore, revoked malicious vehicle can neither derive K B l−j+1 , nor recover it using (8) , due to the fact that r j j (TV j i ) = 0 for it. In the end, the design objective is ensured that the message from revoked vehicle cannot pass the GSK-based check.
IV. PROPOSED MESSAGE AUTHENTICATION PROTOCOL
To obtain a scalable and efficient message authentication protocol, we propose the following design. First of all, we introduce the group signature scheme proposed in [29] to our regional network model to provide security and privacy in message exchange processes, and achieve efficient batch signature verification. In addition, we employ GSK to achieve fast vehicle revocation check.
Our proposed protocol contains the following five main processes: system setup, join region group, message broadcast and authentication, update GSK and track real identity. We assume that, as an initialization process, the TA has already generated several long-term public-private key pairs and several pseudonym certificates for itself, vehicles and RSUs in the VANETs, through some certain PKI cryptography algorithms. Table 2 lists the main notations used throughout the rest of this paper.
A. SYSTEM SETUP
In this stage, the TA first executes the SigGen algorithm and the SigReg algorithm to generate general and regional parameters, respectively, for the group signature scheme. It then executes the PreGSK algorithm to generate parameters for the use of the GSK method.
SigGen: Decide and publish the following heptuple of bilinear parameters (q, G 1 , G 2 , G T , g 1 , g 2 , e) and two cryptographic hash functions H 1 : {0, 1} * → Z * q and H 2 : {0, 1} * → G 1 , where G 1 , G 2 , and G T are three multiplicative cyclic groups with the same large prime order q; g 1 and g 2 are generators of G 1 and G 2 , respectively; e : G 1 × G 2 → G T is a bilinear map that satisfies the properties of Bilinearity, Non-degeneracy, and Computability [22] , [30] .
SigReg: Let φ: g 2 ) . Afterwards, the TA sends these parameters to RSUs in the corresponding group, where (A, Z ) works as the group public-private key pair.
B. JOIN REGION GROUP
When a vehicle requests to join a region group, at the beginning, a PKI-based mutual authentication between the vehicle and a nearby RSU is performed. A general mutual authentication process in details is introduced in [27] . If both identities are valid, they execute the JoinRegGroup process to generate the corresponding private-public keys (y, Y ), Group Member Certificate (GMC) and GSK for the vehicle.
JoinRegGroup is an interactive procedure between a vehicle and an RSU, as shown in Fig. 2 . The detailed process is given as:
(a) The corresponding RSU, noted as R i , sends the group signature parameters of the region group to the request-making vehicle, noted as V i , through the message
R , V i executes the VehGen algorithm to generate a private-public key pair (y, Y ) and a tracking key T , and it sends (Y , T ) to R i for applying GMC through the message M 1
V is timestamp. VehGen: Randomly choose y ∈ Z * q as its private key, decide public key and tracking key using Y = U y 1 and T = g y 2 . In the end, the vehicle sends (Y , T ) to the corresponding RSU.
(c) After receiving M 1 V , R i executes the RSUGen algorithm to generate the GMC
} in its tracking list in potential use of track member procedure.
RSUGen: Check if e(Y , g 2 ) = e(U 1 , T ) holds to ensure Y = U y 1 . Randomly choose k ∈ Z * q and generate C 1 and C 2 according to C 1 = g k 1 and
V is the timestamp. VehVer: Verify if e(C 2 , g 2 )e(C 1 , h 2 )e(C y 1 , U 2 ) =A holds. The proof of the above formula is demonstrated below:
(e) After receiving M 2 V in the j th session, R i executes the IssGSK algorithm to generate the forward key K F j , the backward key K B l−j +1 , the temporary anonymous identity TV j i and polynomial ω j · f (TV j i , y) for V i . Then, it sends message M 3
R being the timestamp.
(f) When receiving M 3 R , V i executes the GetGSK algorithm to get the GSK j .
C. MESSAGE BROADCAST AND AUTHENTICATION 1) MESSAGE BROADCAST
Assume that a vehicle V i generates a plaintext M i containing information such as message sequence number, position, speed, direction and timestamp. Before broadcasting M i , V i signs it by using the MesSign algorithm.
MesSign: Randomly choose a variable t ∈ Z * q , and then derive
i ). Then, V i broadcasts its safety message M i : {M i ||σ i }.
2) MESSAGE AUTHENTICATION
When receiving a safety message, the receiver first perform the pre-check process to confirm that the message has not changed during the transmission and that the vehicle is unrevoked, otherwise, the message will be discarded. Then, the receiver verifies the correctness of the message signature to ensure accountability. The detailed process is described below.
a: PRE-CHECK
For the message M i from V i , the receiver performs the verification process by firstly generate a new value of σ 5 i using
, which is included in M i , local GSK and hash function H 1 (·). Then, check if the new σ 5 i is equal to the original σ 5 i in M i . If the equality holds, continue the authentication process; otherwise, discard the message.
Note that, since a revoked vehicle cannot get the valid GSK within the vehicle group, it cannot generate a σ 5 that passes the pre-check process executed by an unrevoked vehicle.
b: SINGLE AND BATCH VERIFICATION
Following the pre-check process, our method supports both single and batch verification methods.
(a) Single manner: The receiver uses the system parameters (g 2 , h 2 , U 2 ) and the group public key A to check if (14) holds. If the equation holds, the message receiver accepts M i as valid. Otherwise, the receiver neglects it.
(b) Batch manner: For another safety message M j , which has passed the pre-check, from another vehicle V j within the same group, similar verification process can be performed, as in (15) .
From (14) and (15), we can derive (16) . As a simplified verification method, the receiver can simultaneously verify M i and M j by checking if (16) holds. In terms of computation complexity, using the batch manner to verify two messages saves three bilinear pairing operations compared to performing single-manner signature verification process twice.
Similarly, the message receiver can simultaneously verify n message signatures from different vehicles of the same group. In this way, the computational complexity can be reduced by 3 (n − 1) bilinear pairing operations.
D. UPDATE GSK
Since a malicious vehicle might be involved in a group, the GSK needs to be updated to introduce a revocation process. First, RSUs execute the UpdGSK algorithm to distribute revocation polynomials r j j (x) and polynomials h j j (x), where j = 1, 2, . . . , j. Then, unrevoked vehicles execute the RecGSK algorithm to calculate the jth forward key, recover backward key K B l−j+1 , and thus get the new GSK.
E. TRACK REAL IDENTITY
This procedure is performed to reveal the real identity of a vehicle when relevant accountability is needed.
(a) Given a signature σ o , RSUs query their local database to find the tuple
The RSU holding the target tuple sends the matched public key PK V o to the TA.
(b) The TA queries its database to find the corresponding tuple V o , PK V o that is recorded when vehicle registered, and then obtains the real identity V o of the target vehicle.
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we analyze the security properties of our proposed protocol.
A. IDENTITY AUTHENTICATION, MESSAGE INTEGRITY, NONREPUDIATION AND CONDITIONAL ANONYMITY
In our protocol, to generate the safety message signature σ = (σ 1 , σ 2 , σ 3 , σ 4 , σ 5 ), (t, h 1 , y, Y , C 1 , C 2 , GSK ) are required, among which t is a random number. h 1 is one of group signature parameters held by all group members. y is generated and held by vehicle itself. Public key Y is generated by a vehicle node using private key y and is transmitted to RSU in encrypted manner, and deriving y from Y is a discrete logarithm (DL) problem. (C 1 , C 2 ) is a pair of GMC generated by RSU using Y and is transmitted to a vehicle in encrypted manner. The GSK is only held by unrevoked vehicles and is computationally secure. All these secret materials are stored in tamper-proof devices.
Based on the aforementioned analysis, we can conclude that only valid and unrevoked vehicles hold the GMC and the GSK. In addition, our message authentication method can determine whether the sender of the message has the GMC and the GSK, such that the identity of the sender can be authenticated. Furthermore, by checking σ 5 based on hash operation, the message receiver can check if the message was modified. Moreover, a valid group member can sign a message only using its own keys, thus nonrepudiation can be achieved for all the messages a vehicle sends. Therefore, in such way our protocol can achieve the objective of the design: identity authentication, message integrity and nonrepudiation.
In terms of conditional anonymity, vehicles use PKI-based pseudonyms from the TA and their real identities are not revealed to RSUs; furthermore, they use GMC distributed by RSUs to prevent privacy tracking from attackers. At the same time, under specific conditions, RSUs have the ability to trace the PKI-based pseudonym of a vehicle using its safety message signature, and then the TA can reveal the real identity of the vehicle based on its PKI-based pseudonym, as described in section IV-E. Accordingly, our protocol is capable to provide conditional anonymity.
B. RESISTANCE TO IMPERSONATION ATTACKS, TRACKING ATTACKS, SYBIL ATTACKS, REPLAY ATTACKS AND DOS ATTACKS
In our protocol, the private key y, which is used to sign safety message, is held only by the vehicle itself, and it is securely stored in the tamper-resistant device. In addition, message sender randomly chooses a variable t to compute σ 1 = C 1 g t 1 and σ 2 = C 2 (h 1 · Y ) −t , and it is a typical DL problem that extracts the GMC (C 1 , C 2 ) from the message signature. As a result, the adversary can neither obtain the GMC from the message signature during the effective polynomial time. Therefore, any other entity cannot impersonate the vehicle to send a safety message.
By using the variable t, the GMC of the message sender is blinded, so that the verifier can only determine whether the sender belongs to the group or not; however, it cannot distinguish the sender between any two group members. Thus, our protocol is able to defend against tracking attacks based on identity association.
Every vehicle can only endorse one safety message once, because σ 4 = H 2 (M ) y is automatically generated by the message sender using the hash value of the message M and its private key y. Apparently, σ 4 is unique. As a result, vehicles can only generate a unique signature for a particular message, and Sybil attacks cannot be launched.
In addition, we embed timestamp in messages, and upon receiving a message, a vehicle receiver first checks whether the timestamp is valid. If the timestamp expires, the receiver discards the message. Therefore, our proposed protocol can effectively resist replay attack.
Furthermore, through GSK-based check in our method, a vehicle can quickly verify the validity of a sender as a group member, and using batch authentication method, a vehicle can authenticate a large number of messages in a short time. Thus, our protocol can greatly reduce denial of service (DoS).
Moreover, once an attacker is found, the GSK of the corresponding region group will be updated. The result is that the safety message from the attacker will not be able to pass the pre-check process. Accordingly, the attackers can be revoked in time.
VI. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the proposed protocol in terms of computation time cost, message delay and message loss rate.
A. COMPUTATION TIME COST
Since GSIS protocol [21] , the protocol proposed in [22] and our protocol are all based on group signatures and have similar security properties, we compare their computation time cost for safety message signing and authentication in this section.
Bilinear pairing operation and point exponentiation operation are two complex operations that mainly determine the speed of safety message signing and authentication, and we denote the time taken to complete these two operations as T p and T e , respectively. Moreover, T p and T e are found to be approximately 4.5 ms and 0.6 ms, respectively, run by an Intel Pentium IV 3.0 GHz machine [32] . Table 3 summarizes the computation time cost of the three protocols for safety message signing and authentication.
In signing process, our protocol involves four exponentiation operations, and both the GSIS protocol and the protocol in [22] have a signing time cost of 3T p +12T e . Apparently, our protocol takes the lowest computation time cost for signing message.
In message authentication process, our protocol consists of revocation check and signature verification. Our method performs efficient revocation check based on GSK and hash operations. Due to the reason that the computational complexity of hash operation is very low [13] , it is considerably negligible and will not be addressed in this paper. In terms of signature verification, we provide both single and batch signature verification. The time cost T for verifying n safety message in single manner is 3nT p . By using the batch signature verification method, as described in section IV-C, the time cost T for verifying n safety messages is 3T p + T e , which is not influenced by the number of safety messages. Accordingly, with the batch signature verification method, the number of time consuming computation operations of performing bilinear pairing is reduced to 1/n of single signature verification manner.
As a comparision, in GSIS protocol, when a safety message is received, a vehicle checks revocation status through CRL, which involves two pairing operations for an identity in CRL [21] . Besides, the computation complexity of linear search algorithm and binary search algorithm for searching a CRL is O (L) and O (log L) respectively, where L is the length of CRL. With the GSIS protocol, the time cost T G for authenticating n safety messages is
where N is the number of revoked vehicles in CRL.
In [22] , the time cost T S for verifying n safety messages is 2T p + 14nT e , whereas vehicle revocation check is not available.
Denote the time-cost ratio R 1 and R 2 as the ratio between the time cost of the aforementioned two protocols and the time cost of our protocol, respectively. Fig. 3 and Fig. 4 depicted R 1 = T /T G and R 2 = T /T S versus the number of messages to authenticate when the number of revoked vehicle is 0 and 1, respectively. Obviously, a ratio of less than 1 indicates that our protocol has a lower time cost. From Fig. 3 and Fig. 4 , we can see that the performance of our protocol is always better than GSIS protocol and the protocol in [21] , and the advantage is more obvious as the number of message increases. Furthermore, compared with Fig. 4 , the change of R 1 in Fig. 3 is relatively slow. The reason is that as the number of revoked vehicle increases, the authentication time cost of the GSIS protocol will increase significantly. The change of R 2 in Fig. 3 and Fig. 4 are nearly the same, this owing to two reasons. On the one hand, we use the GSK to implement revocation check, and the computational cost is negligible. On the other hand, the revocation check is not implemented in [22] .
It is worth mention that the number of malicious vehicles is not large in a typical VANET and we adopt the decentralized group management model, so it is reasonable to assume only a few revoked vehicles in our evaluation. 
B. SIMULATION
To further estimate the practical performance of our protocol, we compare it with the GSIS protocol on average message delay and message loss rate through simulations. Since the protocol proposed in [22] does not achieve revocation check, we do not involve it here.
We use SUMO to generate a simple road scenario, simulate the network by OMNeT++ under IEEE 802.11p, and use Veins to couple the simulators. The total length of the road is 3km. The properties of vehicles are assumed as follows: the maximum number of vehicle is 120, the distance between adjacent vehicles is 100m, and the maximum speed of travel is 90km/h. Safety message is valid for 20s. The channel bandwidth bound is 6Mb/s. Consider that the message authentication process involves vehicle revocation check, we build experimental scenarios with the absence and presence of revoked vehicle.
1) EXPERIMENT WITHOUT REVOKED VEHICLE
When there is no revoked vehicle, the revocation check is not required. In this situation, the average message delay D msg within a single hop communication range is defined as follow: (18) where N is the number of vehicles involved in our simulation, M j is the total number of messages received by vehicle node V j , T V i −m sig is the time taken by vehicle node V i to sign message
is the time taken to transmit message m from V i to V j , and T V j −m ver is the time taken by V j to verify message m. Fig. 5 shows the relationship between average message delay and the number of vehicles, and Fig. 6 shows the corresponding message loss rate. The message loss rate is defined as the ratio between the number of dropped messages and the sum of received and dropped messages. From Fig. 5 , we can see that, as the number of vehicles increases, the average message delays of our protocol and the GSIS protocol both increase slightly and are approximately 19ms and 31ms respectively. From Fig. 6 , we can see that when the number of vehicles is less than 20, the message loss rate of both protocols is 0, and as the number of vehicles increases, the message loss rate increases. Compared with the GSIS protocol, the average message delay of our protocol is obviously smaller, indicating that the efficiency of our protocol in signature verification process is greatly improved. Moreover, the reason that the message loss rate increases with the number of vehicles is that the increasing number of messages will eventually cause channel congestion or buffer overflow. Lastly and obviously, our protocol is demonstrated to be able to authenticate messages more efficiently, and the message loss rate of our protocol is always lower than the GSIS protocol.
2) EXPERIMENT WITH REVOKED VEHICLE
When there are revoked vehicles in the network, the average message delay within a single hop communication range is defined as follows:
where T c ver is the time for vehicle revocation check, and other variables have the same definitions as in (18) .
As mentioned earlier, usually there are very few revoked vehicles in the network. Therefore, we only simulate the situations where the number of revoked vehicle is 1 and 2. Fig. 8 depict the average message delay versus the total number of vehicles in the network, when there are 1 and 2 revoked vehicles, respectively. We can notice that in both scenarios, the average message delay of our protocol is about 19ms, which is the same as the situation without revoked vehicle shown in Fig. 5 . This is due to the reason that our protocol implements vehicle revocation check through GSK, and the delay caused by hash operation is very low, therefore, with the increasing number of revoked vehicle, the average message delay does not change obviously. For the GSIS protocol, however, the average message delay is approximately 45ms and 49ms, respectively, which is significantly higher than the situation when there is no revoked vehicle, compared with Fig. 5 . This is because the GSIS protocol employs CRL-based vehicle revocation check, and the pairing operation involved is computationally expensive, resulting in a significant increase in the average message delay as the number of revoked vehicle increases.
VII. CONCLUSION
In VANETs, safety message received by vehicle needs to be authenticated efficiently. For this purpose, our protocol combines batch group signature verification and GSK in regional group model to achieve privacy preservation and efficient safety message authentication. Our proposed protocol can adequately meet security requirements and outperforms the existing group-signature-based authentication protocols in terms of computation time cost, message delay and message loss rate.
Although our protocol implements efficient message authentication to recognize the validity of a sender's identity, it does not recognize the trustworthiness of the sender's message content. In future work, we plan to construct a trustworthy communication environment and protect the vehicles' privacy simultaneously.
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